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The appropriateness of imposing criminal liability for negligent conduct has 
been the subject of debate among criminal law scholars for many years.  Ever 
since H.L.A. Hart’s defense of criminal negligence, the prevailing view has 
favored its use.  In this essay, I nevertheless argue against criminal negligence, on 
the ground that criminal liability should only be imposed where the defendant was 
aware he was engaging in the prohibited conduct, or where he was aware of 
risking such conduct or result.  My argument relies on the claim that criminal 
liability should resemble judgments of responsibility in ordinary morality as 
closely as possible.  I argue that responsibility judgments in ordinary morality are 
based on the agent’s having acted intentionally, and that an agent does 
intentionally what he chooses to do.  Because agents choose to bring about those 
effects of their actions they foresee as reasonably likely to follow from what they 
do, they are responsible for such effects.  They are not responsible for effects they 
do not foresee, or for effects they deem highly unlikely, and they ought not to be 




The purpose of this paper is to revisit an old question, namely whether there 
should be crimes of negligence.  The anti-negligence position was most famously 
articulated by J.W.C. Turner in 1936, in an essay arguing that foresight of criminal 
harm provides a necessary condition for criminal liability.1  Turner’s primary 
argument for this claim was that a system of criminal liability that dispenses with 
foresight of harm is tantamount to a system of strict liability.  This position was 
commonly accepted among criminal law theorists for many years.2
Turner’s position, however, was forcefully attacked by H.L.A. Hart, who 
argued that the idea that negligence is a form of strict liability is based on “a 
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this paper was originally presented, as well as members of the UCLA Legal Theory Workshop.  I 
owe a particular debt of gratitude to Kurt Baier, David Gauthier, and Michael Thompson for their 
patient supervision of the original doctoral dissertation, entitled Ethics and the Intentional, from 
which Parts II through V of this paper is drawn.  I also benefited from conversations with George 
Fletcher on the question of criminal negligence. 
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mistaken conception both of the way in which mental or ‘subjective’ elements are 
involved in human action, and of the reason why we attach the great importance 
which we do to the principle that liability to criminal punishment should be 
conditional on the presence of a mental element.”3  Turner’s mistake, Hart claimed, 
was to see negligence as a state of mind.  While he agreed that the mind of the man 
who acts inadvertently is a blank with respect to something he did negligently, 
Hart argued that we need not locate the notion of mens rea in a defendant’s 
subjective state of mind.  Instead he writes, “we can perfectly well both deny that a 
man may be criminally responsible for ‘mere inadvertence’ and also deny that he is 
only responsible if ‘he has an idea in his mind of harm to someone.’”4  Negligence 
lies not in the state of a man’s mind, but in his failure to live up to an objective 
standard of conduct. 
Imagine a workman mending a roof in a busy town, throwing bricks into the 
street below him without looking to see if anyone is passing by.  According to 
Hart, Turner would require us to choose between two possibilities: Either the 
workman has the conscious idea that he might harm someone, in which case he is 
to blame for any injuries he causes, or he has no such idea, in which case any harm 
he inflicts is inadvertent.  But, argues Hart, the workman “failed to comply with a 
standard of conduct with which any ordinary reasonable man could and would 
have complied: a standard requiring him to take precautions against harm.”5  This 
entitles us to hold him responsible, despite the fact that he lacked awareness of 
what he was doing.  Hart’s central argument is thus that we can account for the 
“subjective” element of fault in normative terms, by tying the standard of liability 
to an individual’s particular capacities.  The workman acts negligently, not merely 
inadvertently, because he has a duty to take care to avoid injury, and he has the 
capacity to take such care.  As long as the standards to which we hold one another 
are adjusted to account for the capacities of the defendant, there is no reason to 
think we have adopted an “objective,” or strict standard of liability.   
Criminal law theorists have largely sided with Hart’s view of the matter, with 
the result that Turner’s position is no longer seriously defended.  Most criminal 
commentators now seem to accept liability for negligence in at least some form.6  
In my view, however, Turner had the better position, even if he lacked compelling 
arguments for it.  There are two reasons for this.  First, Hart incorrectly takes 
Turner’s argument to be a blanket attack on objective systems of liability.  Hart 
then counters what he takes to be Turner’s point by turning to a standard that takes 
into account the defendant’s own capacities.  And Hart is right that a negligence 
standard tailored to the defendant’s capacities would certainly be non-objective in 
                                                                                                                                                   
3   H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 139 
(1968). 
4   Id. at 147. 
5   Id. at 147–48. 
6   See George Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. 
PA. L. REV. 401, 415 (1971). 
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the sense of being individualized.  But individualized is not the same as subjective.  
And Turner’s argument is not just an attack on objective approaches to liability.  It 
is rather an insistence that a person should not be held criminally liable in the 
absence of some subjective awareness on his part of what he was doing, under its 
prohibited description.  To answer this challenge by saying that negligent liability 
is individualized is non-responsive.   
Second, and more importantly, Turner’s claim that negligent liability is a form 
of strict liability seems to me to be absolutely correct.  It is, moreover, correct for 
precisely the reason Turner gives, namely that liability in the absence of that 
subjective element is objectionable because it is liability in the absence of ordinary 
responsibility.  Turner’s problem was that he was unable to offer any account of 
responsibility, and hence he lacked any way of accounting for the relevance of 
subjectivity to that notion.  It is the purpose of the present essay to remedy this 
deficiency by providing such an account.   
In what follows, I approach the question by placing negligent criminal 
liability in the context of a more general theory of responsibility for action.  That 
is, I assume that the criminal law is simply another form of ordinary, non-criminal 
responsibility.  (I attempt some defense of this claim at the end of the essay, but for 
the moment will simply assume it.)  I then approach the question of negligent 
responsibility in a roundabout way: I examine another type of responsibility for 
“unintended” effects, namely cases in which an agent is aware of, but does not 
intend, the violation of a prohibitory norm.  Extrapolating from these cases, I argue 
that our ordinary responsibility practices are predicated on the notion of choice.  
As such, they extend only to things agents do with awareness of what they are 
doing or risking.  I conclude that negligence is incompatible with traditional 




Placing criminal liability in the context of judgments of responsibility in 
ordinary morality does not make our task easier.  For ordinary morality both seems 
to encompass, and to reject, liability for negligent conduct.  We sometimes find 
ourselves irate with a person for forgetting something important, at the same time 
that we accept “I simply forgot” as a plea in exoneration.  While criminal law 
theorists have sometimes thought ordinary morality firmly on the side of 
responsibility for inadvertence, ordinary moral practice is not as clear a guide as 
might be supposed.  For this reason, I shall approach the problem of negligent 
responsibility by the back door.  Instead of considering ordinary moral practices 
relating to forgetting, inadvertence,7 and failure to take precautions, I shall begin 
by considering our moral practices relating to clear cases of responsibility.  I shall 
                                                                                                                                                   
7   See id. at 415 (“In daily conduct, we confidently blame others who fail to advert to 
significant risks.”). 
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then attempt to extrapolate a conception of responsibility from these more ordinary 
cases, and see what it in turn implies for cases of negligence. 
The dominant treatment of responsibility in the philosophical literature sees 
that notion as a normative one—a judgment made of a human agent for something 
he did, rendered on moral grounds.  Moreover, normally the thing the agent did 
was bad or reprehensible.  Philosophers treat an agent as “morally responsible” for 
what he is to blame for having done.  They do not tend to speak of “responsibility” 
for praiseworthy acts. 
This way of proceeding may seem peculiar, but many authors on this subject 
at least tacitly assume it, and some even defend it explicitly.  R.J. Wallace, for 
example, writes that 
 
the question of what it is to be a morally responsible agent should be 
given what I call a normative interpretation.  If we wish to make sense of 
the idea that there are facts about what it is to be a responsible agent, it is 
best not to picture such facts as conceptually prior to and independent of 
our practice of holding people responsible.8
 
Hart had previously defended this position as well.  In The Ascription of 
Responsibility and Rights, he wrote: “[S]entences of the form ‘He did it’ have been 
traditionally regarded as primarily descriptive whereas their principal function is 
what I venture to call ascriptive, being quite literally to ascribe responsibility for 
actions.”9  Responsibility ascriptions are made, he claimed, in accordance with a 
set of antecedent moral or legal norms.  Hart’s account in that paper is both 
prescriptive and conventional: Responsibility is something that must be assigned, 
the way people are assigned numbers waiting on line in a bakery, and the form in 
which responsibility is assigned is a function of social purposes.  As Hart wrote, 
“assigning responsibility in the way we do assign it tends to check crime and 
encourage virtue,” and Hart thought this provides both the explanation and the 
justification for our assigning responsibility where and how we do.10
While Hart later distanced himself from his early work on responsibility,11 the 
ascriptivism of his account remained in other guise, and with it, the problems with 
that approach.  The central problem is that the ascriptive approach leaves us 
empty-handed when it comes to describing an agent’s relation to ordinary, non-
morally charged actions.  Smith’s playing the piano, on this account, is not 
something we can lay at Smith’s door, assuming he did not play particularly well 
or badly, since there would be no moral or conventional purpose to making such an 
                                                                                                                                                   
8   R.J. WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 1 (1994). 
9   H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 151 
(Antony Flew ed., 1965). 
10  Id. at 173.  This aspect of Hart’s view remained central to his writing in later years, and to 
his famous claim that what he called the General Justifying Aim of Punishment is a utilitarian one. 
11  See HART, supra note 3, at 145. 
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assignment.  But we would say that Smith is responsible for injuring the child, if 
he hit him, or for breaking the window, if he threw a baseball through it, since 
judging him thus fits with some normative purpose we have in mind.  It is odd, 
however, to think of playing the piano as fundamentally different from hitting the 
child or breaking the window.  We most naturally think of agents as equally 
responsible in all three cases. 
What we require from a notion of responsibility is a way of capturing an 
agent’s relation to ordinary things he does, without yet considering whether those 
actions are morally significant.12  Thus Smith is the agent of, or is responsible for, 
playing the piano, tying his shoelaces, combing his hair, and sipping his coffee.  
Moreover, he is responsible for these things in a way that he is not responsible for 
tripping over the rug, spilling his coffee, and kicking his leg when the doctor tests 
his reflexes.  What we want, in other words, is a way of capturing an agent’s 
relation to things he does qua rational agent, since these are things for which it 
makes sense to raise questions of praise or blame.  We require, in short, a 
descriptive conception of responsibility. 
In criminal law theory, the persistent application of a normative conception of 
responsibility has had certain infelicitous results.  First, the normative approach 
makes it difficult to make sense of certain justifications and excuses.  What should 
we say, for example, about the person who robs the bank under duress, if we think 
the pressure he was under provides him with a good excuse?  Most naturally, we 
would say he is responsible for robbing the bank, since he did so intentionally, but 
that we do not blame him for it because he did it for a good reason.  That is, we 
distinguish his prima facie responsibility for robbing the bank from his ultimate 
blameworthiness for it, and find a basis for withholding criminal punishment based 
on the latter.  On a normative conception of responsibility, however, we must say 
he is not responsible for robbing the bank.  Not surprisingly, this is precisely how 
Hart treats such cases: He says that the fact that someone did something 
“accidentally,” “inadvertently,” “by mistake,” or “while insane” has the same 
effect as his acting in self-defense or under duress, in that both sorts of defense 
defeat prima facie responsibility.    
The question regarding negligence arises at the level of the prima facie case: 
Is a person who brings about harm inadvertently responsible for it, in the 
descriptive sense?  Hart says that a person can be responsible for things he does 
negligently because we can blame him for failing to live up to a normative 
standard of which he was capable.  But this approach confuses responsibility with 
blameworthiness.  We cannot ask about a person’s normative failings until we 
examine whether he is responsible in a descriptive sense.  Our question is thus 
whether people are responsible for what they do inadvertently, such that they 
might sometimes be blamed for failing to live up to a certain normative standard.  
                                                                                                                                                   
12  I mean here to be focusing on responsibility for “things done,” as opposed to what we 
might call “capacity responsibility,” namely the set of capacities that characterize normal adults. 
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This will require us to investigate more thoroughly the nature of the descriptive 
notion of responsibility for which I have been arguing.  We turn to this below. 
A second drawback of the normative approach to responsibility is that it will 
require divergent accounts of responsibility for moral and legal judgments.  Since 
moral and legal criteria for normative judgments diverge, the relevant accounts of 
agency will also diverge if that notion is already infused with judgments of 
blameworthiness.  But it seems reasonable to suppose that the conditions of 
responsibility themselves should be invariant as between moral and legal 
responsibility, and that what differs between the two is just the particular 
normative system one brings to bear on the responsible agent’s conduct.  Moral 
and legal responsibility should have a common denominator, and it is this that the 
normative approach to responsibility cannot capture.  The task of the next section 
will be to articulate an account of a descriptive notion of responsibility that might 




What is the feature that best characterizes things human agents do in their 
capacity as rational animals?  The usual philosophical answer is that human beings 
act as rational animals insofar as they act according to an end.  Human reason is 
thus fundamentally teleological, and human behavior is characteristically rational 
insofar as it is motivated in this way.  The notion of responsibility we have been 
discussing is both characteristically human and intrinsically related to the idea of 
action.  A natural thought to have about the notion of responsibility we have 
identified, then, is that it can be accounted for in teleological terms. 
We may find confirmation for this approach in the traditional philosophical 
analysis of the notion of “intentional action.”  According to the Standard Account, 
a person acts intentionally just in case he acts for a reason, where acting for a 
reason implies that he acts for the sake of something he wants or is trying to get.  
The Standard Account can be summarized with the following two theses: 
 
Thesis (1): Someone does something intentionally if (and only if) he 
does it for a reason. 
 
Thesis (2): Someone does something for a reason if (and only if) he does 
it for the sake of something he wanted or was trying to get. 
 
We might then attempt to combine the Standard Account with a thesis about 
responsibility:  
 
Thesis (3): Someone is responsible for something he did if (and only if) 
he did it intentionally.13   
                                                                                                                                                   
13  J.L. Mackie calls a closely related principle the “straight rule” of responsibility.  J.L. 




In combination with the Standard Account of intentional action, Thesis (3) 
would define the ambit of responsibility as those things an agent does for the sake 
of something he wants. 
If all three of the above theses were correct, we would have to conclude that 
agents are not responsible for things they do unintentionally.  But it will be 
immediately apparent that we cannot reason in this way, since there are at least 
some cases of things agents do unintentionally for which we cannot deny 
responsibility.  Considering such cases will make clear that at least one of Theses 
(1) through (3) must be false.  
Consider this case.  A seller of goods is about to ship some heavily insured 
cargo aboard a passenger plane, when the buyer cancels his order for the goods.  
Faced with the prospect of imminent financial ruin, the seller formulates a plan to 
destroy the plane: plant a bomb to explode mid-flight and collect the insurance on 
the goods.  He regrets that the passengers will almost certainly die in the process, 
but he is not dissuaded.  He executes his plan, and as expected the cargo is 
destroyed, and no one survives.  Call this case “Insurance Bomber.” 
Unlike where examples of negligence are concerned, we cannot simply 
abandon the claim that the insurance bomber is responsible for the deaths for the 
passengers, given that he is fully aware his actions will result in their deaths.  
Indeed, Insurance Bomber is a paradigmatic case of responsibility for evil, since 
truly reprehensible conduct often stems more from indifference and selfishness 
than from directed malevolence.  But it should be clear that we cannot say the 
insurance bomber is responsible for the deaths of the passengers at the same time 
that we maintain Theses (1) through (3).  For Thesis (3) implies that if the bomber 
is responsible for killing the passengers, he must have killed them intentionally.  
But according to the Standard Account (Theses (1) and (2) together), he did not 
kill them intentionally because he did not kill them for a reason.  We must 
therefore choose between rejecting the Standard Account and rejecting the thesis 
that connects responsibility with what an agent does intentionally (Thesis 3).  
The obvious solution might seem to be to reject Thesis (3).  And the instances 
in ordinary morality in which we do appear to blame agents for causing harm 
unintentionally weigh on the side of this solution.  Cases like Insurance Bomber, 
we might be tempted to argue, show conclusively that we do hold agents 
responsible for things they do unintentionally.  And while this does not mean that 
we hold them responsible for all unintentional harm they cause, there is no reason 
in principle to reject responsibility for unintentional harm in cases in which 
ordinary morality seems to support such ascriptions of responsibility.  There is thus 
no reason in principle to reject the blameworthiness of negligent conduct in 
                                                                                                                                                   
MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 208 (1977).  Mackie identifies the straight rule as 
the rule that “an agent is responsible for all and only his intentional actions.”  Thesis (3) talks about 
something someone did, rather than about actions, in order to include intentional omissions within its 
scope. 
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ordinary morality, and so no reason to reject the use of negligent liability in the 
criminal law. 
Proponents of the Standard Account might argue in this way.  Indeed, Jennifer 
Hornsby has argued vigorously that one should not expect the theory of action to 
“deliver the goods” for the criminal lawyer.  On the one hand, the notion of 
intentional action is entirely a psychological one.  She writes: “whether someone 
did something intentionally is, in a certain sense, a question about  
her . . . .  [I]t is to her states of mind that we need to advert in order to settle the 
question.”14  But the question of responsibility is a normative one.  There is thus no 
reason to suppose that the former concept would provide a basis for making 
ascriptions of the latter sort.  Thesis (3) is confused, she would say, in seeking to 
connect the concept of intentional action with judgments of responsibility.  
Intentional action, like intention, tracks reasons for acting.  But ascriptions of 
responsibility are entirely a matter of the norms to which we subscribe.  Hornsby’s 
view of intentional action would fit well with Hart’s ascriptive account of 
responsibility. 
I nevertheless believe this quick and straightforward solution to our problem 
mistaken, for at least two reasons.  First is a point in ordinary language concerning 
the adverb “intentionally.”  It seems perfectly appropriate to say that the person 
who knocks over the vase through inadvertence does not knock it over 
intentionally.  This is even so when the consequences are grave, such as the tragic 
case of the person who runs his own child over when backing down a driveway.  If 
the agent was not aware of any risk that his child was behind him, then even if he 
should have been aware of a risk, we do not say he ran over his child 
“intentionally.”  But it would be exceedingly odd to say that the bomber did not 
kill the passengers intentionally.  It is much less odd to say that he did not intend to 
kill them.  And this indicates a curious feature about the family of concepts 
surrounding intention and intentional action: What a person does, intending to do 
it, may identify a narrower class than what a person does intentionally.  The 
bomber, for example, did not intend to kill the passengers.  But it seems quite 
natural to say he killed them intentionally.  
Now the fact that more things are done intentionally (under a given 
description) than are done with an intention is not, by itself, an argument for 
retaining Thesis (3).  But it does make it possible to retain Thesis (3), even if the 
reach of responsibility is broader than the class of things people do with an 
intention.  And if the observation from ordinary language we made is correct, then 
there is reason to draw out the concept of what is done intentionally in precisely 
the way that is required: We can make the concept of intentional action as broad as 
the concept of responsibility.  If we have a way of making this broader notion of 
intentional action philosophically respectable, we would have found a way of 
making Thesis (3) philosophically respectable as well.  
                                                                                                                                                   
14  Jennifer Hornsby, On What’s Intentionally Done, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 
55, 66 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993). 
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The second problem with the above argument for the elimination of Thesis (3) 
is that there is some independent reason to think Thesis (3) correct.  In particular, 
cases like Insurance Bomber support the idea of a linkage between intentional 
action and responsibility.  There is a felt connection between responsibility and 
what is done intentionally that is lacking in the relation between responsibility and 
what is done with an intention.  Imagine how outrageous it would be for the 
bomber to say, “Yes, I admit I killed the passengers intentionally, since I knew that 
they would die.  But I am not responsible for killing them, since I didn’t intend to 
do so.”  Rather, the fact that he killed them intentionally seems to carry with it the 
idea that he is responsible for killing them.  And conversely, it would be only a 
little less odd for someone to deny that he did something intentionally, but not 
regard that as mitigating his responsibility.  The person who says, “I didn’t do it 
intentionally” seems to be making a plea for exoneration.  He seems to be offering 
his hearers a reason why they should not blame him for something he did.   
To some, the idea of a connection between judgments of intentional agency 
and judgments of responsibility seems quite obvious.  Indeed, some philosophers 
have claimed that the concepts bear an analytic relationship to one another.  R. A. 
Duff, for example, writes that “[a]scriptions of intentional agency are, as a matter 
of meaning, ascriptions of responsibility.”15  If this intuitive connection between 
responsibility and intentional action is correct, we have particular incentive to try 
to cash out the latter notion in a way that will provide an appropriate foundation 
for judgments of responsibility.  As we shall see, this would supply quite a 
different solution to our problem than rejecting Thesis (3), which seemed at first 
most appealing.  Instead of rejecting Thesis (3), we would be required to reject 
either Thesis (1) or Thesis (2).  Let us consider these possibilities in turn. 
The solution that rejects Thesis (1) would preserve the view that acting for a 
reason is acting for the sake of an end.  It would also retain the connection between 
responsibility and what an agent does intentionally.  But it would reject the 
connection between what an agent does intentionally and what he does for a 
reason, and along with it, the standard association between what an agent does 
intentionally and what he intended to do.  Acting with an intention, on this view, is 
associated with acting for a reason, while what an agent does intentionally would 
be linked to the broader category of responsible agency.  Reason thus sides with 
the narrower concept of intention, rather than the broader concept of responsibility.  
According to this solution, then, the insurance bomber killed the passengers 
intentionally, and he is responsible for having done so, but he did not intend to kill 
them, since he did not kill them for a reason. 
Michael Bratman favors this solution.  He rejects what he calls the “Simple 
View,” according to which it follows from the fact that someone did something 
intentionally that he intended to do it.  Thus consider the person who knowingly 
scratches a car next to him when pulling into a tight parking space.  The Simple 
View would say that if he intentionally scratched the car, he must have intended to 
                                                                                                                                                   
15  R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY & CRIMINAL LIABILITY 77 (1990). 
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scratch it.  But since the driver did not intend to scratch the car, given that he did 
not try to scratch it, we cannot say he scratched it intentionally.16  But Bratman 
thinks it is possible to do something intentionally without having intended to do it.  
The driver intentionally scratched the car, despite the fact that he never intended to 
scratch it.  Bratman does not claim that all foreseen side effects of one’s 
intentional actions are intentional.  Only those effects that lie within the 
“motivational potential” of one’s action should be thought of as done 
intentionally,17 meaning that a person must have consciously adverted to and 
actually deliberated on an effect for it to count as something done intentionally.  
There is no reason to think that I intentionally wear down the soles of my shoes 
when I run a marathon in the normal course of events, even if I am aware of 
wearing them down.  But if there is some reason why I particularly attend to that 
effect of my action, such as that my shoes are a family heirloom, then it makes 
sense to say I wear them down intentionally, despite the fact that I do not intend to 
wear them down.  Such cases falsify the Simple View. 
Someone who rejects the Simple View must reject the Standard Account as 
well: Theses (1) and (2) in combination commit one to the position that doing 
something intentionally entails that one intended to do it, assuming we treat acting 
with an intention as a species of acting for the sake of an end.  So Bratman must 
reject either Thesis (1) or Thesis (2).  Which of the two theses does he in fact 
reject?  Bratman accepts the standard, instrumental approach to practical reason, 
according to which an agent acts rationally insofar as he acts in pursuit of 
something he wants.  His argument for rejecting the Simple View is limited to the 
notion of intentional action, and he otherwise aligns acting with an intention with 
what an agent does for a reason.  His central claim is that the usual account of 
practical reason fails to accord sufficient weight to planning activity.  Plans give us 
reasons to do things, in a way that allows rational agents to avoid having to go 
back each time to their background reasons in order to decide what to do.  But 
plans, like intentions, are teleological: an agent who acts on a plan acts for the sake 
of an end.  As Bratman explains, plans are “intentions writ large.”18  By expanding 
rational agency to include planning, Bratman is not fundamentally challenging the 
teleological structure of instrumental rationality.  His rejection of the Simple View 
is thus an implicit rejection of Thesis (1).   
For the driver pulling into the tight parking spot, Bratman says, scratching the 
adjacent car is part of his overall plan for parking his car.19  Its being part of his 
plan makes it intentional, but it does not make it something done for a reason, 
since scratching the car is not a means to parking the car.  On both the standard 
conception and the planning conception of agency, the driver has no independent 
                                                                                                                                                   
16  MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTIONS, PLANS AND PRACTICAL REASONS, ch. 8 (1987). 
17  Id. at 124–26.  For a variation on this theme, see DUFF, supra note 15, ch. 4. 
18  BRATMAN, supra note 16, at 29. 
19  Id. at 29. 
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reason to scratch the car—independent of his plan for parking his car.  And if he 
has no independent reason for scratching the car, he has no reason for scratching it, 
Bratman says. 
But someone might argue for a different understanding of such cases.  Why 
does the fact that the driver has no independent reason to scratch the adjacent car 
mean he has no reason?  Why doesn’t the fact that he has a reason for adopting the 
plan of which scratching the car is a part give him a reason to scratch it?  True, if 
he pulled into the space without scratching it, he would not have a reason to back 
up and try again, this time cutting it closer so as to ensure a scratch.  But it is not 
clear why independence is a necessary condition for something to count as a 
reason.  Another feature of reasons is that they provide explanations for people’s 
actions.  Here, the fact that the driver wanted to pull into the parking spot does 
explain why he scratched the car.  I shall explore this thought in greater detail in 
the next Part.  I mention it now only to suggest that if plausible, it would provide 
us with a way of making sense of Bratman’s claim that the driver scratches the car 
intentionally—namely that he does so for a reason. 
The problem with accounts that reject Thesis (1) is that it is not of any 
obvious benefit to be able to say that an agent did something intentionally if that 
notion is not one we can relate to the rational-explanatory principle on which he 
acts.  The intuition that agents are responsible for what they do intentionally 
presumably stems from an intuitive link between an agent’s doing something 
intentionally and his reasons for acting.  Judgments of responsibility bear a special 
relation to rational agency to the extent they bear on an agent’s reasons for acting.  
To misappropriate a thought from Elizabeth Anscombe, the realm of responsibility 
is the realm of things to which a certain sense of the Why? question has 
application, where that question calls for the agent’s reason for doing what he 
did.20  But if we reject the connection between intentional action and reasons for 
acting, we cannot say that a person who acts intentionally must be able to explain 
what he did in terms of his reasons for acting. 
Let us call an account of responsibility that connects what an agent is 
responsible for with what he does for a reason an “internalist” account.  And let us 
call any account that denies this connection “externalist.”  The view that consists 
in rejecting Thesis (1) and retaining Theses (2) and (3) is externalist, since the 
category of what an agent does intentionally is broader than the category of what is 
done for a reason.  What I have in effect suggested is that we may have grounds 
for preferring an internalist to an externalist account, insofar as judgments of 
responsibility are most intelligible to us if they connect with reasons for acting.  
Let us consider what an internalist account, namely an account that rejects Thesis 




                                                                                                                                                   
20  ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE, INTENTION § 5 (1957). 
                       OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW                  [Vol 2:579 590
Insurance Bomber demonstrated a tension between our intuitions about 
responsibility and our intuitions about intentional action.  We have considered two 
possible solutions thus far.  The first is the Standard Account of intentional action, 
according to which the notion of responsibility should have nothing to do with our 
underlying account of intentional action.  The second solution would distinguish 
what a person does with an intention from what he does intentionally, as a way of 
allowing judgments of responsibility to connect with the latter notion.  But it 
would restrict the category of things people do for reasons to that which they 
intended to do, and would articulate the category of intentional action in a way that 
is distinct from reasons for acting.   
We will now consider a third solution.  This solution preserves the 
connections between what an agent does intentionally and responsibility, as well as 
between what an agent does intentionally and what he does for a reason.  Its 
account of responsibility is “internalist,” insofar as it ties judgments of 
responsibility to reasons for acting.  But it abandons the claim that acting for a 
reason is limited to acting for the sake of an end.  Like the second solution we 
considered, this solution uncouples doing something intentionally from doing 
something with an intention: What is done with an intention is still understood in 
terms of the “for the sake of” relation, while what is done intentionally is 
accounted for in terms of some broader view of acting for a reason. 
The difficulty for this account lies in offering an acceptable alternative to the 
“for the sake of” requirement Thesis (2) imposes.  Reasons for acting have long 
been thought of in teleological terms—the reason for which something is done is 
the reason for the sake of which it is done.  If we wish to say the insurance bomber 
kills the passengers for a reason, we will have to offer an account of what it is to 
do something for a reason which does not require reason for the sake of which, 
since the insurance bomber does not kill the passengers for the sake of anything. 
The insurance bomber’s reason for blowing up the plane is to get the 
insurance money on the cargo.  If asked why he blew up the plane, his answer, if 
truthful, would mention this reason.  The claim of those who adhere to the 
Standard Account is that unlike blowing up the plane, the insurance bomber has no 
reason for killing the passengers.  As Anscombe suggests, the Why? question in 
this case is “refused application.”21  But as we already briefly saw in discussing 
Michael Bratman’s view, perhaps this is incorrect.  Suppose we were to ask the 
insurance bomber why he killed the passengers.  Although he cannot answer with 
“in order to get the insurance money,” he might respond by saying “Well, I wanted 
the insurance money, and to get it I had to blow up the plane and kill the 
passengers.”  Compare this Why? question with a question about something else 
the insurance bomber might have done, namely run the insurance company out of 
business by creating such a large claim.  Assuming he was unaware that 
destroying the cargo would have this effect, the question why he ran the insurance 
company out of business would truly be “refused application.”  Unlike his answer 
                                                                                                                                                   
21  Id. 
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to the question why he killed the passengers, the insurance bomber might answer 
this question with an expression of surprise—“Did I do that?”.  This gives us a 
basis for thinking that the Why? question test differentiates foreseen from 
unforeseen effects of an agent’s action. 
Recall, however, that a standard philosopher of action, like Hornsby or 
Davidson, thinks it unnecessary to distinguish foreseen from unforeseen effects in 
action-theoretic terms.  Indeed, they might argue that if we are searching for an 
action-theoretic concept to which we can tie responsibility, we should look to the 
category of everything an agent does.  Davidson suggests as much when he says 
that “[e]vent causality can spread responsibility for an action to the consequences 
of the action . . . .”22  So instead of seeking to ground responsibility in the narrow 
class of things done for a reason, we might look to the wider category, namely the 
class of all things agents do.  On this suggestion, then, the realm of responsible 
agency would extend past the realm of culpable (or praiseworthy) agency.   
The difficulty with this suggestion is that while we previously could not 
account for responsibility judgments because the class to which they attached was 
too narrow, we now cannot account for them because the class to which they 
would attach is too broad, namely the class of all things agents do.  Human beings 
are not responsible for everything of which they are agents in Davidson’s sense.  
We want to be able to say the insurance bomber is responsible for killing the 
passengers, but not for running the insurance company out of business.  But 
attaching responsibility to causal contribution would not allow us to distinguish the 
two.   
Responsibility seems to occupy a middle category between things agents do 
for the sake of an end and all things they do.  To provide a foundation for 
judgments of responsibility, we need some way of identifying this middle category 
in action-theoretic terms.  The solution that rejects Thesis (2) in favor of a broader 
account of acting for a reason achieves this.  The second solution we considered, 
that which rejects Thesis (1), may seem to identify the relevant middle category as 
well, since it retains the connection between responsibility and what an agent does 
intentionally.  But it is ultimately unhelpful, insofar as it leaves the notion of the 
intentional itself unaccounted for.  It thus fails to supply the internalist foundation 
we earlier claimed was desirable. 
A thoroughly internalist account, by contrast, must explain intentional action 
in terms of a broad notion of acting for a reason.  The category of things for which 
an agent is responsible is then the category of things done for reasons.  In this Part 
I shall explore the idea that the notion of choice might ground an internalist 
account of the relation between the ends an agent sets for himself and the foreseen 
effects of his pursuit of those ends.  Because foreseen side effects are themselves 
chosen, an account based on choice will allow us to distinguish killing the 
passengers from running the insurance company out of business in the way we 
have thought desirable.  This would allow us to distinguish internal, 
                                                                                                                                                   
22  Donald Davidson, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 43, 49 (1980). 
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intentionalistic explanation from external, non-agentive explanation without 
limiting this distinction to that between things an agent does for the sake of an end, 
on the one hand, and everything else he does, on the other. 
This solution involves two separate claims: 
 
Thesis (4): If someone φ-s pursuant to a choice to φ, he φ-s for a reason. 
 
Thesis (5): If someone foresees that in ψ-ing he will φ, then in ψ-ing he 
chooses to φ. 
 
If Theses (4) and (5) are true, an agent does for a reason anything that he 
does, foreseeing he will do it.  Since the insurance bomber foresaw the passengers’ 
deaths, he killed the passengers for a reason, namely that he wanted the insurance 
money on the cargo.  And if an agent does for a reason anything he foresees he 
will do in the course of acting, then he does all such things intentionally.  If Thesis 
(3) is correct, then he is responsible for anything he foresees he will do, and he is 
not responsible for anything unforeseen in the course of acting.  Thus, unlike 
Bratman, who would exclude a number of foreseen side effects from the ambit of 
what is done intentionally, I would include all fully foreseen effects.  (We will 
discuss the question of partially foreseen effects in the next Part.)  And I would 
exclude all unforeseen effects from the scope of responsible agency.  What, 
however, is the argument for Theses (4) and (5)? 
First consider Thesis (4).  Thesis (4) asserts not merely that if an agent 
chooses to φ, and then φ-s, there is some description of his action under which he 
φ-s for a reason.  This is true, but unhelpful in expanding the concept of acting for 
a reason.  It also asserts that a person who chooses to φ, and actually φ-s, acts for a 
reason under the description of his action which is his φ-ing.  Thus, the thesis 
asserts that if the insurance bomber chooses to kill the passengers, he kills them for 
a reason, even though he did not particularly desire their deaths.  What could make 
this true? 
When an agent chooses to accept a certain consequence of an action he 
performs, he is in some way endorsing that consequence, at least in relation to his 
chosen end.  That is, the agent could decide to abandon his end when he sees that 
certain consequences will follow from the means he must adopt to accomplish it.  
The fact that he continues to pursue the end, given the consequences of doing so, 
suggests an important connection between the consequences an agent considers in 
selecting that end and the end itself.  The consequences of the agent’s action (both 
side effects and intended effects) thus stand in a certain relation of value to one 
another in the agent’s deliberations, by which I mean that there is a value, or set of 
values, that explains the agent’s willingness to do this-for-the-sake-of-that, a 
background system that relates the thing done as means to the thing aimed at as 
end.   
Only given this background normative system can citing the agent’s end 
explain the thing done: The rational explanatory force of the agent’s end stems 
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from the fact that its relation to the thing done reflects some antecedent value the 
agent holds.  From this it follows that an agent must have actually deliberated upon 
a consequence of an action in order for us to explain what he did as a product of 
his reason.  It is explanation in light of an agent’s reasons that allows us to see the 
agent as acting for a reason, and hence as acting intentionally.  In the absence of 
this reflection, the thing the agent does is accidental from the standpoint of value—
the agent cannot himself have endorsed it.  Deliberation puts the stamp of rational 
agency on what an agent does. 
What, now, about Thesis (5)?  This thesis seems to require little argument.  
The suggestion is simply that an agent exercises choice over the effects of his 
actions he foresees.  An agent need not choose something for its own sake in order 
to have chosen it.  This way of thinking about choice seems to square with our 
ordinary use of the term.  Imagine once again our outrage at the insurance bomber 
if he insisted that he had “no choice” but to kill the passengers, given that he had 
the end of destroying the plane.  The fact that he could have avoided killing them 
by abandoning his plan, but chose to continue anyway, seems an adequate basis for 
saying he chose to kill the passengers.  Choice, unlike intention, is non-
teleological. 
Together, Theses (4) and (5) suggest that an agent can be thought of as 
performing an action for a reason under any description under which it was 
foreseen by him.  An action is intentional under any description under which it is 
foreseen, and hence it becomes plausible for us to say that an agent is responsible 
for his action under any description under which it was done intentionally.  We can 
thus retain Theses (1) and (3) and reject Thesis (2).  In this way, our account is 




What conclusions can we draw for criminal liability from the foregoing 
account of responsibility?  A defendant who performs a prohibited act or brings 
about a prohibited result knowingly does so for a reason, and hence he does so 
intentionally.  He is thus responsible for it in the descriptive sense we identified in 
Part II, and can be morally and legally evaluated for his behavior.  By contrast, a 
defendant who is wholly unaware of the prohibited act does not do the prohibited 
thing for any reason.  He is therefore not responsible for the prohibited act or 
consequence, and cannot be blamed for having done so.  It would follow that there 
should be no criminal liability for negligent violations of a criminal norm. 
Now even if one accepts the account I have offered, matters may not be this 
straightforward.  For we have yet to consider cases in between the above two 
extremes, where the defendant is aware he is running a risk of violating a criminal 
prohibition.  If the risk eventuates, does the defendant engage in the prohibited 
conduct or bring about the prohibited result for a reason?  He certainly runs the 
relevant risk for a reason, since he knowingly does that.  But this does not by itself 
tell us whether he brings the prohibited conduct or result about for a reason, in 
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virtue of having foreseen that he might bring it about.  The account I have offered 
suggests that he does in cases in which the likelihoods are sufficiently high of his 
bringing it about, and otherwise not.  If he thinks his act is highly likely to result in 
the death of another, for example, there is little difference between his 
responsibility in that case and the cases we have been considering in which he is 
certain to bring about death.  At the other extreme, however, if the defendant is 
aware of a risk that a certain result will occur, but that risk is so minimal as to be 
almost non-existent, he approaches the agent who did not foresee the risk and is 
better thought of as not bringing about that result intentionally.  He is probably not 
responsible for it in that case.   
To be sure, there will be gray-area cases in the middle.  Does a defendant who 
runs a fifty percent risk of killing someone kill that person intentionally?  And if 
so, what about a slightly smaller or slightly greater risk?  The uncertain response of 
the present account to such cases does not seem to count against it, given that such 
cases are unsettled both in morality and in law.  The important point is that the 
cases in which we are inclined to treat the agent as responsible for the consequence 
will be ones in which we are also inclined to think he acted intentionally, whereas 
the ones in which we judge him not responsible are cases in which we think of his 
conduct as unintentional. 
Notice that this approach to agents who knowingly engage in risky behavior 
comports with the criminal law’s standard definition of recklessness.  The Model 
Penal Code (MPC) defines recklessness as when a person “consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that the prohibited result will occur.23  By 
requiring that the risk the defendant perceived be “substantial,” the MPC exempts 
the defendant who brings about a highly unlikely harm from the ambit of 
recklessness.24  The MPC does not indicate what level of likelihood is sufficient to 
count as “substantial;” a lacuna the Commentaries to the Code specifically endorse 
by saying that the matter is properly left to the jury’s discretion.25  But if 
“substantial” is a descriptive, rather than a normative concept, then the MPC’s 
notion of recklessness roughly covers the same territory as the account of 
responsibility defended here.26
An interesting question arises in the case in which the defendant is aware of 
running a risk, but in which he underestimates the magnitude of the risk.  The 
MPC does not indicate whether the substantiality of the risk should be included 
                                                                                                                                                   
23  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (1962). 
24  Such a defendant would not even be “negligent” under the MPC’s definition (§ 2.02(d)), 
since even the risk involved with negligence must be “substantial.”  The difference between 
recklessness and negligence is of course that the risk need not be perceived where the latter is 
concerned. 
25  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 237 (1985). 
26  Peter Arenella has recently argued to me that the MPC’s understanding of “substantial” is 
in fact normative rather than descriptive.  And if this is correct, then recklessness as defined under 
the MPC would not be suited to a descriptive conception of responsibility. 
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within the agent’s conscious disregard: Should the defendant be considered 
reckless as long as he was aware of running a risk, and the risk was substantial and 
unjustifiable, even if his perception of the risk was that it was not substantial?  The 
better account, and one supported by the approach proposed here as well, is that 
the agent who consciously disregards a substantial risk is responsible for the 
consequence that eventuates from that risk only if he was aware not only of the 
risk’s existence, but also of its substantiality.  The defendant who believes a risk to 
be considerably smaller than it in fact is, such that he would not be responsible if 
the risks were as he supposed, would not be responsible for the consequence if it 
eventuates from the risk.  But the reverse is not true.  A defendant who thought a 
risk substantial when it was not would not be responsible for the eventuation of the 
risk, despite the fact that he believed he was acting in the face of a high likelihood 
of bringing about the very harm that did occur.27
It is worth noting an aspect of the MPC’s approach to recklessness with which 
we might disagree.  The MPC builds “justifiability” into the very definition of 
recklessness.  The purpose of this provision is clear: the surgeon who performs a 
highly risky operation is not reckless, since he runs the risk of bringing about the 
patient’s death justifiably.  I believe this is a mistake.  It conflicts with the idea of a 
non-moralized conception of responsibility, according to which responsibility is 
only the precondition for praising or blaming an agent for something he did.  
Saying he is not reckless is tantamount to saying he is not responsible for killing 
the patient.  But that seems wrong.  The surgeon who performs a highly risky 
operation is fully responsible for the death of his patient, if such results.  But he is 
not to blame for having killed him, since he has a justification for having done so, 
namely that the patient stood to benefit from the operation, and consented to its 
occurrence on that basis.  The MPC approach to recklessness builds the 
justificatory condition into the definition of the mental state, thus confounding 
prima facie conditions of responsibility with ultimate conditions, in just the way 
we saw with Hart’s account above. 
Accounting for responsibility in terms of foresight of harm, as Turner 
originally proposed, thus gives us a plausible approach to responsibility, an 
approach that easily generalizes to responsibility judgments in the criminal arena.  
It also makes sense of several important aspects of existing criminal law doctrine.  
In particular, it suggests that criminal negligence should be a much disfavored 
form of liability.  It would place criminal negligence in a class of rather marginal 
doctrines of responsibility, such as complicit and vicarious liability, doctrines for 
which we have no justification other than their overall utility.  But if, as I 
suggested at the outset, criminal responsibility is simply another form of 
                                                                                                                                                   
27  Such cases are unlikely to arise in practice, particularly as there is a tendency to exaggerate 
the ex ante risks of an unlikely event occurring once it actually does occur.  But if the defendant 
could convincingly show that the risk of which he was aware was in fact minute, he should be treated 
like the person who commits an attempt: he is only liable for any crime that attaches to believing he 
is behaving badly.  He was not in fact behaving badly. 
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responsibility in ordinary morality, consequentialist arguments for its imposition 




I shall conclude by considering two important objections to the account I have 
traced.  The first objection is that the descriptive account of responsibility must 
presuppose some account of causation, since an agent must cause the conduct or 
result he foresees in order to be responsible for it.  But it is commonly thought that 
the commonsense notion of cause already has the notion of responsibility built into 
it, and thus the former cannot be used to elucidate the latter.  As William Dray has 
pointed out, if two historians were to debate “whether it was Hitler’s invasion of 
Poland or Chamberlain’s pledge to defend it which caused the outbreak of the 
Second World War,” they must be discussing who was at fault for the outbreak of 
the war.28  Or consider two cars that collide at an intersection, where one driver 
had a stop sign and the other a clear right of way.  Our judgment that the driver 
who failed to stop at the sign caused the accident would surely reflect a judgment 
that the accident was that driver’s fault for failing to stop.  Otherwise we might as 
well say the accident was caused by the non-faulty driver’s failing to drive just a 
little bit faster or a little bit slower.  Cases such as these have led some authors to 
conclude that the notion of causation must be preceded by a moral theory, and that 
we cannot identify anything as the cause of anything else non-normatively.29
If the above claims about causation were correct, the account I have offered 
would be problematic.  For if the notion of cause is parasitic on that of fault, then 
“being the cause of” cannot be an ingredient in a purely descriptive account of 
responsibility.  Instead, responsibility must be imputed, since the causal relations 
on which it depends would themselves be imputed.  If this is correct, there is no 
reason to resist responsibility in the absence of foresight of consequences.  For we 
would have no reason not to “impute” responsibility to agents whose conduct falls 
below a certain normative standard.  The appropriateness of such imputations 
would be a matter of the purposes we had in making them, as Hart early on 
suggested.  And given that even an agent’s unintentional behavior can be 
influenced or deterred with threat of sanction, punishment for unintentional 
conduct might suit our purposes.30
But one should not infer from the indeterminate nature of causation in some 
cases that causation is indeterminate everywhere.  In particular, the central cases of 
responsibility we might consider display no causal indeterminacy.  If I kill you by 
shooting you, no one would seriously deny that the shooting was the cause of your 
                                                                                                                                                   
28  WILLIAM H. DRAY, LAWS AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY 100 (1957). 
29  Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Luck and Responsibility, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1994). 
30  Indeed, it might turn out to be the case that imputing responsibility in the absence of 
causation suited our purposes.  On this view, there would be no reason to resist such imputations 
either. 
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death, despite the fact that, like the discussion of Dray’s historians, there are other 
causal factors required for my shooting to cause your death.  As Joel Feinberg 
writes, “[e]xplanatory citations single out abnormal interferences with the normal 
course of events or hitherto unknown missing links in a person’s understanding.  
They are designed simply to remove puzzlement by citing the causal factor that 
can shed the most light.”31  That we are not presupposing a judgment of culpability 
when we identify one causal factor as the cause is moreover evident from the fact 
that we can identify causal factors where human agents are not involved: the cause 
of that tree’s falling over can be identified in terms of the “abnormal interference” 
of high winds.32
There are, however, two sorts of cases in which the normative account of 
causation seems particularly difficult to avoid.  The first is one in which several 
causal factors vie for position as overall cause of an event, and there is no clear 
irregularity that suggests itself as cause.  But such cases need not stand as a 
challenge to the descriptive account of responsibility.  For on a descriptive 
account, it is acceptable to conclude that more than one agent is “responsible” for 
an occurrence, since this does not entail that more than one agent is to blame.  
Thus, Chamberlain might be “responsible” for the outbreak of war, along with 
Hitler, since actions of both contributed causally to that outcome, but one need not 
therefore conclude that both agents are to blame.  If the supposed causal 
indeterminacy rests on the existence of multiple causal factors, it need not threaten 
our ability to offer a descriptive account of responsibility, since that account 
requires only the existence of a causal factor, not necessarily a unique causal 
relationship. 
In this sense, judgments of responsibility are different from judgments of 
culpability.  If we are asking who was to blame for a certain occurrence, we are 
normally asking for a unique identification, or at any rate, if more than one person 
was to blame, each must independently satisfy the moral criteria for 
blameworthiness.  But where non-normative responsibility is concerned, it is not 
objectionable to ascribe partial responsibility to each causal factor, tailoring 
responsibility to degree of causal contribution.  This common-sense approach to 
causation is only possible once responsibility is uncoupled from blame. 
The second sort of case in which the normative approach may seem inevitable 
is one in which there is a clear irregularity to use as a basis for choosing among 
                                                                                                                                                   
31  Feinberg calls this “the lantern criterion” for causation.  Joel Feinberg, Sua Culpa, in 
DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 204 (1970). 
32  Feinberg’s proposal is subject to the objection that there are many instances in which we 
can inquire into the causes of ordinary events.  Thus, we can ask what causes the tides, or the earth to 
turn, or the sky to appear red at sunset, even though these are the most ordinary of events.  But we 
might distinguish here between events generally and particular events.  Feinberg’s suggestion seems 
correct as applied to the latter.  Thus, we cannot easily ask what made the sky appear red at the end 
of the day today, unless it was unusually red, i.e., displayed an irregularity.  The question otherwise 
can only be a request for an explanation of sunsets generally, and it is here that Feinberg’s suggestion 
seems less helpful. 
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causal factors, but in which the irregularity can only be identified normatively.  It 
is this way with omissions, as in the case of the driver who failed to stop at the stop 
sign.  While these cases seem more challenging for the descriptive approach to 
responsibility, the following answer suggests itself.  One need not infer from the 
fact that the irregularity is normatively identified that the causal relation is itself a 
normative one.  That is, the law establishes a duty to stop at stop signs, in light of 
which other drivers come to have both a (normative) right to rely on the 
observance of this duty and a (descriptive) expectation that drivers will stop at stop 
signs.  Where a driver fails to stop at a stop sign, the expected regularity is not 
present, and the breach of regularity can be identified as the cause of the resulting 
accident.  That we can identify the driver who fails to stop at the sign as the cause 
of the accident without relying on a judgment of fault can be seen by considering 
the justified omission, namely the man who is driving his wife in labor to the 
hospital.  We can still identify the failure to stop at the stop sign as the cause of the 
accident, even though the defendant has a justification for failing to stop and hence 
is not at fault.  And this shows that the notion of cause can provide an independent 
element in a conception of responsibility, even where omissions are concerned. 
A second objection to the account I have offered concerns my assumption that 
criminal responsibility mirrors our responsibility practices in ordinary morality.  
Given that individuals are sometimes held criminally liable for harm they did not 
foresee, and even sometimes for harm they did not cause, why do I think that 
criminal responsibility mirrors moral responsibility?  Corporate responsibility and 
vicarious liability might further support one’s suspicion that the criminal law is 
just a series of conventions, united under a single institution.  The institution of 
criminal justice presumably is meant to satisfy some set of social purposes, just as 
the various institutions of tort law serve distinct social goals.  On this view, the 
only constraint on forms of responsibility-ascription should be the contribution 
they make to the relevant institution’s goals. 
While the foregoing would constitute a perfectly coherent view of the 
criminal law, I do not believe it is our view.  It is true that there are isolated 
instances in which criminal responsibility is merely “imputed” without regard for 
the underlying “facts” about responsible agency, but most rules of criminal 
liability nevertheless track our moral practices quite closely.  At the very least, the 
core prohibitory norms of the special part, those based on common law crimes, are 
rules of moral disapprobation.  And while there are many more recent regulatory 
offenses that cannot be readily intuited from our moral practices in the way that the 
common law crimes can, most of these are reasonable extensions of common law 
crimes.  Those that are not might be questioned. 
To be sure, we could conceive the criminal law along different, more 
utilitarian lines.  We could regard criminal law exclusively as an instrument for 
social control, and treat the rules of criminal liability as a list of prices meant to 
discourage inefficient behavior.  But, as many theorists have noted, the institution 
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would probably lose its effectiveness in this form.33  The criminal law’s connection 
with morality is a crucial part of its ability to deter and to contribute to the teaching 
of moral standards.  There is thus a consequentialist argument for designing rules 
of criminal conduct that mirror the practices of responsibility we follow in our 
moral lives, that is, a consequentialist reason for maintaining an institution that 
incorporates norms of responsibility and blame. 
                                                                                                                                                   
33  Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997). 
